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IAC-D-55/4
(Final)
25 August 1953

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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

NSC STATUS REPORT ON THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

1. Attached for the information of the IAC agencies is a copy of subject report as reproduced by the National Security Council Secretariat.

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2. In view of the fact that this final issue is the same as IAC-D-55/4 (Revised), it is only being issued to members of the IAC in the form of a single copy for the record.

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NO. 9 — THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM (Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee)

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OBJECTIVE

For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of CIA, under the direction of the National Security Council —

- (1) to advise the NSC in matters concerning such intelligence activities of departments and agencies as relate to the national security;
- (2) to make recommendations to the NSC for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies as relate to the national security;
- (3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities: provided, that CIA shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions: provided further, that the departments and other agencies shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence: and provided further, that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;
- (4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the NSC determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;
- (5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the NSC may from time to time direct.

-- National Security Act of 1947, as Amended

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No. 9 - THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

(In concurring in this report, the IAC agencies wish to point out that the effects of recent budget cuts on intelligence activities cannot be assessed at this time, and are therefore not reflected in this report.)

I. COORDINATION

- 1. Coordination among the intelligence agencies, so essential toproducing adequate intelligence for national security purposes and to reducing cost by avoiding duplication, is improving. There is still some duplication of effort which adds to the cost of intelligence, but steps are being taken continually to reduce this to a minimum.
- 2. On March 7, at the recommendation of the Director of Central Intelligence, with the concurrence of the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, the NSC issued NSCID No. 16, directing the DCI to ensure coordination of procurement and processing of foreign language publications. No other recommendations for coordination have been made to the NSC during the past six months; however, several improvements in intelligence coordination have been accomplished by mutual agreement among the intelligence agencies and others. There are at present, in addition to the Intelligence Advisory Committee established by NSCID No. 1, nine interdepartmental committees to coordinate important intelligence programs in atomic energy, watch procedures, economic intelligence, economic warfare intelligence, scientific intelligence, clandestine intelligence priorities and foreign language publications.

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II. NATIONAL ESTIMATES

- 1. The organization and procedures established since October 1950 for the production of national intelligence estimates continue to operate satisfactorily. The totality of resources of the entire intelligence community is drawn upon to produce national intelligence estimates, and they can be improved only as we strengthen these resources. These estimates derive authority from the manner of their preparation and from the active participation of all the responsible intelligence agency heads in their final review and adoption. Agency dissents are recorded where estimates would be watered down by further efforts to secure agreement.
- 2. A production program for national intelligence estimates is prepared annually and reviewed quarterly at which time obligatory changes are made. This program provides for a re-examination of existing estimates on critical areas or problems as well as the production of new estimates designed to improve the coverage of important topics. Continued emphasis is placed on the completion of basic estimates on the USSR in advance of the review of US budget estimates and NATO plans.

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- 3. Close coordination between planners and policy-makers on the one hand and the intelligence community on the other is continually being pressed in an effort to make the intelligence produced both useful and timely. The IAC mechanism is most useful when the NSC is furnished with a coordinated intelligence view in advance of the time when the policy is fixed. This is being done with increasing frequency and directness of application to the policy issues.
- 4. Special efforts are being made to get greater precision and clarity in estimates generally. As a particular case, considerable progress was made in NIE-65, "Soviet Bloc Capabilities through 1957", (16 June 1953), over NIE-64, "Soviet Bloc Capabilities through Mid-1954", (12 November 1952):
 - a. Greater analytical precision in the section on political warfare capabilities, which concentrates upon the critical areas of the world, and which distinguishes between the capability to overthrow governments and the capability to influence governments and peoples.
 - b. Greater emphasis on scientific and technical factors, which occupy about a quarter of the discussion in NIE-65.
 - c. Greater clarity in the military strengths and capabilities sections, with fewer figures, more emphasis on military programs, and a more specific analysis of Bloc air defenses and of Soviet capabilities to deliver atomic weapons in the U.S.

III. POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE

- l. The status of political, social and cultural intelligence has been very good, due allowance being made for the paucity of information on the Soviet Orbit and the difficulties of collecting it. Facilities for the production of such intelligence, however, have been adequate only for the needs of the NSC and the most urgent needs of the IAC agencies. Less pressing demands have been met only partially and inadequately.
- 2. The principal deficiency in this field, which varies from slight to serious, has been in the resources devoted to the exhaustive coverage and research on which sound estimates and analyses depend.

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The inadequacy of resources has been reflected chiefly in an inability to prosecute sustained research programs at all desired points. Nonetheless, there has remained sufficient flexibility to produce individual studies of considerable depth on selected major problems.

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